

**ALABAMA PUBLIC SERVICE  
COMMISSION  
GAS PIPELINE SAFETY SECTION**

**Update for**

**Alabama Natural Gas Association  
Spring Seminar 2012**

**March 6, 2012**

**Embassy Suites  
Hoover, Alabama**

## Pipeline Safety Personnel Alignment

Inspectors : North Alabama - Greg Meadows

Central Alabama - Harold Dunson  
Daniel Trapp

South Alabama - Tommy Lancaster  
Clark Brown

Integrity Mgmt. - Judy Ramsey

Training - Bryan Kichler

Admin. Support - Felisa Webster

New Employees: Keith Blackwood, Jr. (North Alabama)

Randy Hammond (Central Alabama)

PSC Update – 2012  
H.R. 2845 Highlights

SEC. 3. PIPELINE DAMAGE PREVENTION.

(a) MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR STATE ONE-CALL  
NOTIFICATION

PROGRAMS.—Section 6103(a) is amended to read as follows:

“(a) MINIMUM STANDARDS.—

“(1) IN GENERAL.—In order to qualify for a grant under section 6106, a State one-call notification program, at a minimum, shall provide for—

PSC Update – 2012  
H.R. 2845 Highlights

“(A) appropriate participation by all underground facility operators, including all government operators;

“(B) appropriate participation by all excavators, including all government and contract excavators; and

“(C) flexible and effective enforcement under State law with respect to participation in, and use of, one-call notification systems.

PSC Update – 2012  
H.R. 2845 Highlights

“(2) EXEMPTIONS PROHIBITED.—In order to qualify for a grant under section 6106, a State one-call notification program may not exempt municipalities, State agencies, or their contractors from the one-call notification system requirements of the program.”

## PSC Update – 2012

### Alabama Bills

HB 93 – One Call Notification System not responsible for damages to underground utilities (if operator has their own one-call system)

HB 386 – Class 2 Municipalities (175,000 – 199,999 in population) One-Call Notification System; Non-participation (Railroads added to this also)

## PSC Update – 2012 H.R. 2845 Highlights

- Section 4. - Requires, if appropriate, DOT to issue regulations requiring the use of remote or automatic shut-off valves, or equivalent technology. . . . where economically, technically and operationally feasible
- Sections 5 & 29 - Requires DOT to evaluate whether gas integrity management requirements should be expanded beyond HCAs, and whether such expansion would mitigate the need for class location requirements.

## PSC Update – 2012 H.R. 2845 Highlights

- Section 7 – Requires DOT to conduct a follow-up biannual survey on whether operators have adopted plans to manage and replace cast iron pipe, and the status of those plans.
- Section 9 – Requires DOT to issue regulations establishing time limits for notification . . . require notification no later than one (1) hour after confirmed discovery of accident or incident.



## PSC Update – 2012 H.R. 2845 Highlights

- Section 22 – If appropriate, DOT shall issue regulations requiring the use of excess flow valves, or equivalent technology, where economically, technically and operationally feasible on new or entirely replaced distribution branch services, multifamily facilities, and small commercial facilities.

## PSC Update – 2012 H.R. 2845 Highlights

- Section 23 – DOT shall require pipeline owners or operators to conduct a verification of the records of the owner or operator for intra- and interstate gas transmission pipes in Class 3 and 4 locations and Class 1 and 2 HCAs
  - Ensure records accurately reflect pipeline physical and operational characteristics
  - Confirm established Maximum Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP)

## PSC Update - 2012

### DIMP Findings:

- ❖ Excavation Damage not included in risk models
- ❖ Twenty-four plan reviews resulted in no need for significant operational changes by the operator – (The inspector believed the problem lies in the frequency of failure factor. If no leaks are found the frequency of failure is 0. Therefore, regardless of the consequence of failure,  $0 \times \text{anything}$  is zero and no action is needed.)

## PSC Update - 2012

- ❖ Operations, Maintenance, and Inspection procedures were not adequately integrated or referenced, when appropriate.
- ❖ Plans were found lacking specificity such as: who, what, when, where, how.
- ❖ Risk calculation models and the specific formula models should be either included in the plan or referenced as an attachment.

## PSC Update - 2012

### DIMP Findings (cont.)

- ❖ The operator should be able to demonstrate why the SME is an expert.
- ❖ Specify how field discovery of inaccurate information is to be relayed to DIMP team and eventually integrated into the DIMP data used for risk ranking and mitigative action implementation.

## PSC Update - 2012

- ❖ Operators must consider the following categories of threats to each gas distribution pipeline: Corrosion, natural forces, excavation damage, other outside force damage, material, weld or joint failure (including compression coupling), equipment failure, incorrect operation, and any other concerns that could threaten the integrity of its pipeline.

## PSC Update - 2012

- ❖ Unique operating environment (i.e. flood plain, area susceptible to landslides).
- ❖ Operators should address failures that do not result in a release to identify potential threats

## PSC Update - 2012

- ❖ **SHRIMP** is a tool. It is only as good as the effort and the information that is put into it.
- ❖ If you have added risks that are not part of the **SHRIMP** program, you must rank them manually for them to show up in the correct placement.
- ❖ **Read the guidelines for the use of SHRIMP!**